Parshat Ki Teitzei: When We Have the Advantage

The Moral Challenge of Power, Vulnerability, and Responsibility

Introduction

Power is not always something we recognize in ourselves. We tend to associate it with authority, wealth, position, or influence, with those whose decisions visibly shape the lives of others. But power is often far more ordinary than that. It exists whenever we hold something another person needs, have choices another person does not, or are able to act while someone else is dependent upon what we decide. Even the freedom to walk away can place us in the stronger position.

The Torah does not treat power itself as something dangerous or wrong. There are times when we will possess authority, ownership, strength, and advantage. The deeper question is what those things ask of us. It is easy to think primarily about what our position allows us to do. Torah is equally concerned with what that position requires of us.

Parshat Ki Teitzei contains an unusually wide range of mitzvot. Moshe speaks about war and family, lost property and debt, workers and landowners, and some of the most vulnerable people within society. The subjects are very different from one another, but again and again he places before Israel situations in which one person has greater freedom to determine what happens than the person standing before him.

Taken together, these encounters raise a demanding moral question. What is asked of us when we are the ones who hold the advantage? Moshe asks Israel to look carefully at those moments and to consider what another person's vulnerability requires from the person who has greater power to decide what happens next.

I. When Victory Gives Us Power

Parshat Ki Teitzei opens with Moshe describing Israel in a position of unmistakable strength: “כִּי־תֵצֵא לַמִּלְחָמָה עַל־אֹיְבֶיךָ וּנְתָנוֹ ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ בְּיָדֶךָ וְשָׁבִיתָ שִׁבְיוֹ” — “When you go out to war against your enemies, and Hashem your God delivers them into your hand, and you take their captives” (Devarim 21:10). The enemy has been defeated and placed b’yadecha—into your hand. Israel has prevailed, and those who have been defeated can no longer determine what happens next. At this moment of victory, Moshe begins to define what the victor may do with the strength he now possesses.

The yefat to’ar, the woman taken captive in war, has lost the protection of her people, her home, and the life she knew. The soldier belongs to the victorious army and holds enormous power over what happens to her. Chazal recognize the intensity of his desire and explain, “לֹא דִבְּרָה תוֹרָה אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד יֵצֶר הָרָע”—the Torah spoke here in response to the yetzer hara (Kiddushin 21b). Even within this concession, the soldier cannot immediately act upon what he wants. His desire is acknowledged, while the Torah restricts what he may do with it.

Rashi, following Chazal, emphasizes the restrictions surrounding this process. The woman is brought into his home, given time to mourn her father and mother, and the soldier must wait. The urgency of the battlefield gives way to a process governed by law. Ramban understands her mourning as genuine grief for the family and world from which she has been torn. During this period, the soldier is required to account for the woman before him and the vulnerability created by her captivity.

Hashem has delivered the enemy into his hand, but the power created by victory carries obligations of its own. The soldier who was permitted to use force in battle is now required to exercise restraint toward someone who can no longer meet him as an equal. The end of the battle changes the way that strength may be used.

Moshe completes the passage by telling Israel that if the relationship does not endure, “וְשִׁלַּחְתָּהּ לְנַפְשָׁהּ וּמָכֹר לֹא־תִמְכְּרֶנָּה בַּכָּסֶף לֹא־תִתְעַמֵּר בָּהּ” — “You shall send her free; you may not sell her for money, nor may you exploit her” (Devarim 21:14). The woman must be allowed to leave, and the soldier's former power over her gives him no continuing claim to profit from her or control what comes next. The limits placed upon his strength remain even when the circumstances that first placed her within his power have passed.

II. When Preference Meets Responsibility

A father has two wives, “הָאַחַת אֲהוּבָה וְהָאַחַת שְׂנוּאָה” — “one beloved and one unloved,” and his firstborn son is the child of the unloved wife (Devarim 21:15). He has authority over his estate, while his personal preference lies with one side of the family, creating the possibility that his feelings will influence what each son receives.

The emotional reality is acknowledged directly: one wife is ahuvah, beloved, and the other senuah, unloved. Moshe commands, “לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר אֶת־בֶּן־הָאֲהוּבָה עַל־פְּנֵי בֶן־הַשְּׂנוּאָה הַבְּכֹר” — “He may not give the son of the beloved wife the rights of the firstborn in place of the son of the unloved wife, who is the firstborn” (Devarim 21:16). Ramban explains that the father may not transfer the status and double portion of the firstborn to the son he prefers. His authority over his property does not extend to changing a right the Torah has already assigned.

The following verse places particular emphasis on recognition, requiring the father “אֶת־הַבְּכֹר בֶּן־הַשְּׂנוּאָה יַכִּיר לָתֶת לוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם” — “to recognize the firstborn, the son of the unloved wife, to give him a double portion” (Devarim 21:17). Rashi, drawing upon Chazal, understands yakir as establishing the father's recognition of the firstborn and the legal consequences that follow from it. What he feels toward the mother cannot change what he is obligated to recognize in her son.

Affection can influence judgment, affecting the exceptions we make, the explanations we accept, and what we believe someone deserves. The father may genuinely wish to benefit the son of the woman he loves. But yakir — the requirement that he recognize the true firstborn — places a limit upon his authority at precisely the point where his feelings could determine what someone else receives.

III. The Power to Walk Away

A person sees his fellow's animal wandering away. He did not cause the loss and has no personal stake in its recovery. He simply finds himself in a position to help. It is within that ordinary encounter that Moshe commands, “לֹא־תִרְאֶה אֶת־שׁוֹר אָחִיךָ אוֹ אֶת־שֵׂיוֹ נִדָּחִים וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם; הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֵם לְאָחִיךָ” — “You shall not see your brother’s ox or sheep straying and hide yourself from them; you shall surely return them to your brother” (Devarim 22:1).

The word “וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ” — “and you hide yourself” draws attention to the possibility of seeing and choosing not to become involved. Rashi, citing Chazal (Bava Metzia 30a), explains that there are circumstances in which one may refrain from returning a lost object, including when doing so would be inconsistent with the dignity expected of that person. The exception establishes that the obligation has boundaries, while the command shows that responsibility can arise simply from encountering another person's loss.

A few verses later, after extending the mitzvah to other lost property, Moshe states, “לֹא תוּכַל לְהִתְעַלֵּם” — “You may not hide yourself” (Devarim 22:3). Sforno understands these words as a demand that one not avert his attention from his fellow's property. The owner may never know who saw what he lost, and the passerby remains physically capable of continuing on his way. Once he has become aware of the loss and is able to respond, however, that knowledge places an obligation upon him.

The passerby possesses no formal authority over the owner. He simply has access to what the owner has lost and the ability to respond. Chazal preserve legitimate limits to what can be demanded of us, but the mitzvah establishes that responsibility can arise before we have agreed to assume it. In some circumstances, the freedom to remain uninvolved becomes subject to obligation.

IV. The Boundary of Being Right

A creditor has something important on his side: a legitimate claim. The debt is real, and he is entitled to collateral. Even so, Moshe places a limit upon how that claim may be pursued when he commands, “כִּי־תַשֶּׁה בְרֵעֲךָ מַשַּׁאת מְאוּמָה לֹא־תָבֹא אֶל־בֵּיתוֹ לַעֲבֹט עֲבֹטוֹ” — “When you make a loan of any kind to your fellow, you shall not enter his house to take his security” (Devarim 24:10). What the creditor is owed gives him rights, but those rights do not give him unrestricted freedom in how he exercises them.

The boundary becomes physical in the command “בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה נֹשֶׁה בוֹ יוֹצִיא אֵלֶיךָ אֶת־הַעֲבוֹט הַחוּצָה” — “You shall stand outside, and the man from whom you have a claim shall bring the security out to you” (Devarim 24:11). Bachutz ta’amod—stand outside. The debt gives the creditor a claim against the borrower, but the borrower's home remains beyond his reach. There is a threshold his legitimate claim does not permit him to cross.

Ramban explains that the creditor must remain outside while the debtor chooses the pledge and brings it to him. This prevents the creditor from entering the home and taking whatever he wishes as security. The debtor therefore retains a measure of control even while obligated to repay what he owes. His financial vulnerability does not place everything he possesses within the creditor's reach.

When “אִישׁ עָנִי הוּא” — “he is a poor man,” the creditor must “הָשֵׁב תָּשִׁיב לוֹ אֶת־הַעֲבוֹט כְּבוֹא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ” — “surely return the security to him when the sun sets” (Devarim 24:12–13). Rashi explains that the pledge is something the poor debtor needs, such as a garment used to cover himself at night. What secures the creditor's loan may also be something the debtor needs for his most basic comfort, and the Torah requires that need to shape how the creditor exercises his right.

The words “בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד” capture the section's central boundary. The creditor remains outside while retaining his claim. The doorway marks the point at which what he is entitled to meets something that still belongs to the person who owes him. Being right does not remove that boundary; Moshe requires the creditor to recognize both.

V. When Another Person Depends on What We Hold

A worker has completed his labor and earned his wages, but until he is paid, something that belongs to him remains in the employer's hands. Moshe addresses that imbalance when he commands, “לֹא־תַעֲשֹׁק שָׂכִיר עָנִי וְאֶבְיוֹן מֵאַחֶיךָ אוֹ מִגֵּרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בְּאַרְצְךָ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ” — “You shall not oppress a hired worker who is poor and destitute, whether one of your brothers or one of the strangers in your land, within your gates” (Devarim 24:14).

That dependence becomes explicit when Moshe requires, “בְּיוֹמוֹ תִתֵּן שְׂכָרוֹ וְלֹא־תָבוֹא עָלָיו הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ כִּי עָנִי הוּא וְאֵלָיו הוּא נֹשֵׂא אֶת־נַפְשׁוֹ” — “On that day you shall give him his wages, and the sun shall not set upon it, for he is poor and he sets his life upon it” (Devarim 24:15). Ki ani hu—he is poor; v’eilav hu nosei et nafsho—his life is bound up with these wages. A delay that may seem minor to the employer can have serious consequences for the person waiting to be paid.

Rashi, citing Chazal, explains “וְאֵלָיו הוּא נֹשֵׂא אֶת־נַפְשׁוֹ” by pointing to the risks a laborer may take in earning his wages, climbing a ramp or hanging from a tree in the course of his work. Ramban similarly emphasizes the worker's dependence upon what he has earned for his sustenance. The money in the employer's possession represents labor, livelihood, and immediate need to the worker.

Dependence appears differently in the laws of the harvest. When a farmer forgets a sheaf in his field, Moshe commands, “לֹא תָשׁוּב לְקַחְתּוֹ; לַגֵּר לַיָּתוֹם וְלָאַלְמָנָה יִהְיֶה” — “You shall not return to take it; it shall be for the stranger, the orphan, and the widow” (Devarim 24:19). The produce belongs to the farmer, but he is required to leave what he has forgotten for those whose circumstances leave them with fewer means of providing for themselves.

The requirement continues with the olive tree and vineyard through “לֹא תְפַאֵר אַחֲרֶיךָ”—do not go back over the branches—and “לֹא תְעוֹלֵל אַחֲרֶיךָ”—do not gather what remains (Devarim 24:20–21). Rashi notes the Torah's repeated designation of what remains for “לַגֵּר לַיָּתוֹם וְלָאַלְמָנָה.” The landowner has the ability to gather more, but that ability does not determine how completely the harvest may be collected.

The employer and the landowner stand in different relationships to what they hold. The wages already belong to the worker, while the harvest belongs to the farmer. In both cases, another person's dependence becomes part of the responsibility carried by the person who has more control over what happens next.

VI. When Strength Preys Upon Weakness

Moshe closes Ki Teitzei with the command “זָכוֹר אֵת אֲשֶׁר־עָשָׂה לְךָ עֲמָלֵק בַּדֶּרֶךְ בְּצֵאתְכֶם מִמִּצְרָיִם” — “Remember what Amalek did to you on the way, when you were leaving Egypt” (Devarim 25:17). He specifies what must remain in Israel's memory about the manner of the attack: Amalek “וַיְזַנֵּב בְּךָ כָּל־הַנֶּחֱשָׁלִים אַחֲרֶיךָ וְאַתָּה עָיֵף וְיָגֵעַ” — “struck all those who were weak at your rear, when you were faint and exhausted” (Devarim 25:18). Rashi explains “וַיְזַנֵּב בְּךָ” as referring to those who were straggling behind. Amalek directed its strength toward the people least able to protect themselves.

Read at the end of Ki Teitzei, Amalek's choice of victim carries the weight of what has come before it. Throughout the parsha, vulnerability has placed responsibility upon those with greater strength, authority, access, or resources. Amalek sees that same vulnerability and uses it to determine where to attack. Those who have fallen behind become targets because they are easier to overcome. What has called forth responsibility throughout Ki Teitzei becomes, in Amalek's hands, an opportunity to exploit.

Moshe includes one further detail in his description: “וְלֹא יָרֵא אֱלֹקִים” — “and he did not fear God” (Devarim 25:18). The same language appears when Avraham explains his fear in Gerar, telling Avimelech, “רַק אֵין־יִרְאַת אֱלֹקִים בַּמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה וַהֲרָגוּנִי עַל־דְּבַר אִשְׁתִּי” — “Surely there is no fear of God in this place, and they will kill me because of my wife” (Bereishit 20:11). In both settings, one person is exposed to what someone stronger may choose to do. Yirat Elokim creates an internal boundary upon human power when circumstances provide few external restraints.

The parsha begins with Hashem placing an enemy “בְּיָדֶךָ” — “into your hand” and ends with Amalek attacking “כָּל־הַנֶּחֱשָׁלִים אַחֲרֶיךָ” — “all those who were weak at your rear.” At the beginning, Israel must learn what is required when another person has been placed within its power. At the end, Amalek directs its strength toward those least able to resist it. Between these two encounters, Moshe teaches Israel what another person's vulnerability must mean to the person who holds the advantage.

Parenting Reflection: When We Have the Advantage

Parenting a struggling teenager rarely feels like a position of power. Many parents experience exactly the opposite. We feel frightened by choices we cannot control, uncertain about what tomorrow will bring, and increasingly aware of how little authority can accomplish when a teenager is determined to move in another direction. There are moments when parents feel as though everyone else has a voice in their child's life while theirs has become the easiest one to ignore.

Parents nevertheless hold considerable power within the relationship. We often control the home, money, transportation, permissions, expectations, and access to things our children need. More quietly, we influence the atmosphere they encounter when they come home, the approval or disappointment they experience from us, and whether they continue to experience themselves as belonging within the family. A teenager may resist our authority while remaining deeply affected by how we use it.

That matters when a teenager is already struggling. A child who is emotionally overwhelmed, questioning his place in the family or community, struggling with Yiddishkeit, making unhealthy choices, or unable to function as he once did may experience much of life from a vulnerable position. Some choices will require boundaries. His vulnerability does not make those choices acceptable, but it should influence how we respond.

Fear can make parental power feel especially necessary. If we can remove something, restrict something, or impose a consequence, we may feel compelled to act before the situation gets worse. Our ability to impose a consequence does not tell us what it will accomplish. We still have to consider its effect on the relationship and how it will be experienced by a teenager who may already feel that very little in his life is within his control.

This can be hardest when we know that we are right. Parents carry real responsibilities, and there will be times when our teenager is clearly making a poor decision. We can be correct about the behavior and still respond in a way that humiliates, or establish a necessary boundary while communicating rejection. Being the parent gives us responsibility for the decision and requires us to consider the person who will live with it.

A struggling teenager still needs parents willing to remain parents. He needs boundaries, judgment, and adults capable of making difficult decisions when necessary. He also needs to know that our authority has not made his dignity less important to us. There will be times when we hold the final word. The deeper question is whether, in those moments, our teenager can still experience us as people who see him, respect him, and remain committed to the relationship even when we cannot give him what he wants.

Conclusion

Ki Teitzei presents a world in which differences of power are unavoidable. People will possess authority, property, strength, and resources that others do not. Moshe does not imagine a society in which those differences disappear. He teaches Israel to become conscious of what they require from the person who holds the stronger position.

That responsibility can be most difficult when our advantage is legitimate. We may have earned what we possess, hold authority that properly belongs to us, or have every reason to believe that our position is correct. None of that removes the need to consider the person affected by our choices. The greater our ability to determine what happens, the more responsibility we carry for how that ability is used.

There will be moments when the advantage is ours and little outside of us prevents us from using it fully. Those are the moments Ki Teitzei asks us to recognize. Another person's vulnerability does not erase what rightfully belongs to us. It places a responsibility upon how we use it. What we do in those moments reveals whether we have understood what it means to have something placed b’yadecha—into our hands.

Have a Wonderful Shabbos!!!

Yaakov Lazar